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INTRODUCTION 
“I would build a great wall, and nobody builds walls better than me, 
believe me, and I’ll build them very inexpensively, I will build a 
great, great wall on our southern border. And I will have Mexico pay 
for that wall.” 
-Donald Trump, Presidential Announcement Speech1 
The pledge to build a wall along the southern United States (U.S.) 
land border was a central and fundamental promise in Donald Trump’s 
presidential campaign.2  Whether or not this wall is built has become 
an important factor in evaluating the success of his presidency and his 
chances at re-election.  After Trump’s proposition that Mexico pay for 
a southern border wall proved infeasible, the Trump Administration 
(Administration) turned to the U.S. Congress, seeking billions in 
funding for the wall.3  This led to the longest government shutdown in 
history.4  For thirty-five days, Congress and the President stood at an 
                                                          
1. Washington Post Staff, Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential 
Bid, WASH. POST (June 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/.  
2. Michael C. Bender, How the Border Wall, Trump’s Signature Campaign 
Promise, Turned into a National Emergency, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2019, 3:34 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-promised-to-build-that-wall-then-ran-out-of-
time-and-options-11550262854; see, e.g., A History of Trump’s Border Wall, 
COUNTABLE (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.countable.us/articles/418-history-trump-s-
border-wall. 
3. See Marianne Levine & Quint Forgey, White House Asks Congress for $5.7 
Billion for ‘Steel Barrier,’ POLITICO (Jan. 6, 2019, 7:49 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/06/trump-emergency-border-wall-
government-shutdown-1082712; Ayesha Rascoe & Domenico Montanaro, 
Democrats Reject Trump Border Wall Proposal, Calling It a ‘Non-Starter,’ NPR (Jan. 
19, 2019, 5:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/19/686876605/trump-offers-
temporary-immigrant-protections-for-5-7-billion-in-wall-money. 
4. See Meg Wagner, Veronica Rocha & Amanda Wills, The Government 
Shutdown Is Over, CNN (Jan. 25, 2019, 10:01 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/government-shutdown-month-
2019/index.html.  
2
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impasse over funding for the proposed wall.5  Throughout the entire 
wall saga, President Trump has relied on the same national security 
messaging to support his blind dedication to the border wall: a 
complete, contiguous physical barrier is necessary to keep out the 
scores of deadly, criminal migrants illegally flooding across the United 
States’ unprotected borders.6  This message has been utilized and 
amplified in order to support President Trump’s political ends. As the 
2020 Presidential election cycle ramps up, the Administration has 
doubled down on the “border crisis” and the need to stem migration to 
the United States by any means necessary to garner and solidify 
political support for re-election.7 
Part I discusses President Trump’s border wall imperative and his 
use of anti-immigrant rhetoric to support a border wall.  It examines 
how President Trump utilizes a mischaracterization of who is 
immigrating to the United States through the southern border, how, and 
why, to serve his political ends.  Part II outlines the United States’ 
international law obligations to asylum seekers and how U.S. law 
contravenes these obligations.  Specifically, it explains the non-
refoulement principle and its corollary, non-rejection. 
Part III discusses the recent developments in policy and practices 
that serve to reinforce Trump’s rhetoric at the expense of asylum 
seekers.  It analyzes the Attorney General’s recent policy shifts, which 
seek to capitalize on these false narratives.  Specifically, it examines the 
“zero-tolerance” policy regarding prosecuting all illegal entrants to the 
United States and the new guidance for asylum officers adjudicating 
expedited removal proceedings.  This section also discusses how 
current U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) policies, either 
established or de facto, are dominating the narrative of border crossers, 
                                                          
5. See id.  
6. Trump’s comments during his first primetime speech to the nation. See, e.g., 
Full Transcripts: Trump’s Speech on Immigration and the Democratic Response, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/08/us/ politics/trump-
speech-transcript.html. 
7. See Stephen Collinson, Trump Launches Immigration Rant in Bid to Rekindle 
2016 Campaign Rage, CNN (June 18, 2019, 10:30 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/18/politics/donald-trump-election-2020-orlando-
florida/index.html; Jeremy Diamond, Trump Launches 2020 Bid with Familiar 
Refrains on Immigration and Trade, CNN (June 18, 2019, 10:42 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/18/politics/trump-orlando-rally-reelection/index.html.  
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specifically in the following two ways: (1) by denying their access to 
U.S. ports of entry; or, (2) upon arrival, by providing falsified or 
incomplete information in their initial screening documents.  Part III 
also briefly overviews the legal challenges undertaken to counter these 
practices. 
Both Part II and Part III address how these changes are impacting 
asylum seekers, in contravention of the United States’ international law 
obligations.  Finally, this article concludes it is critical that the rights 
and protections of asylum seekers in the United States are defended and 
maintained through continued challenges to illegal policy changes and 
more wide-scale legislative changes to bring U.S. law more in line with 
international obligations toward refugees. 
I.  TRUMP’S BORDER WALL IMPERATIVE 
A foundational promise of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign 
was to build a continuous wall along the United States’ southern border 
with Mexico.8  Trump’s hard line stance on immigration and his 
characterization of illegal immigration as the source of many of 
America’s problems in large part activated his Republican base.9  
Trump’s campaign was fueled by the fear of undocumented migrants—
characterizing them as “bad hombres” from Mexico and Central 
America, who were criminals, rapists, and drug addicts, stealing 
American jobs, taking American lives, and exacerbating the drug 
epidemic.10 
                                                          
8. Bender, supra note 2; see, e.g., A History of Trump’s Border Wall, supra 
note 2. 
9. Harry Enten & Perry Bacon, Jr., Trump’s Hardline Immigration Stance Got 
Him to the White House, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 12, 2017, 5:59 AM), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-polls-showing-daca-as-popular-even-
among-republicans-dont-tell-the-whole-story/; see, e.g., Exit Polls, CNN POLITICS 
(Nov. 23, 2016, 11:58 AM), https://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls.  
10. Donald Trump: We Need to Get Out ‘Bad Hombres,’ YOUTUBE (Oct. 19, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AneeacsvNwU; see, e.g., Ian Schwartz, 
Trump: Mexico Not Sending Us Their Best; Criminals, Drug Dealers and Rapists Are 
Crossing Border, REAL CLEAR POL. (June 16, 2015), 
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2015/06/16/trump_mexico_not_sending_us
_their_best_criminals_drug_dealers_and_rapists_are_crossing_border.html; see also 
AP Fact Check: Trump Plays on Immigration Myths, PBS (Feb. 8, 2019, 10:44 AM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ap-fact-check-trump-plays-on-immigration-
4
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Trump’s hardline immigration stance largely contributed to his 
election.  In exit polling, “Trump beat [Democratic nominee] Hilary 
Clinton by 31 percentage points among voters who said immigration 
was the most important issue facing the country.”11  Similarly, “[t]he 
2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study found that 73 percent 
of Trump voters said immigration was of ‘very high importance’ to 
them, [whereas only] 24 percent of Clinton voters [stated the same].”12  
To gain Republican votes in the 2018 midterm elections, the 
Administration once again turned to immigration.  This time, the 
Administration capitalized on the large caravan of migrants from 
Central America, many of whom were asylum seekers making their 
way to the U.S. border. 13  Trump characterized caravan members as 
“stone cold criminals.”14  Just days before the midterm elections, 
Trump deployed 5,200 active duty military troops to the southern 
border, a move some viewed as political theater.15 
In December 2018, Congress and the President reached an impasse 
regarding a $5.7 billion allocation for the border wall in the 2019 fiscal 
                                                          
myths (summarizing major Trump claims about immigrants and offering statistics or 
scholars’ works to analyze those claims). 
11. Enten & Bacon, supra note 9; see, e.g., Exit Polls, supra note 9. 
12. Enten & Bacon, supra note 9 (citing Stephen Ansolabehere, Brian Schaffner 
& Sam Luks, Guide to the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, 
HARVARD (August 2017), https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/news/announcing-2016-
cooperative-congressional-election-study). 
13. See Christopher Cadelago & Ted Hesson, Why Trump Is Talking Nonstop 
About the Migrant Caravan, POLITICO (Oct. 23, 2018, 5:05 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/23/trump-caravan-midterm-elections-
875888; Eugene Scott, Before the Midterms, Trump Harped on the Migrant Caravan. 
Since Then, He Hasn’t Brought It Up., WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/08/before-midterms-trump-
harped-migrant-caravan-since-then-he-has-barely-mentioned-it/; John Fritze & 
Christopher Schnaars, President Trump Latches onto Migrant Caravan as Top Issue 
in Midterms, USA TODAY (Oct. 25, 2018, 4:36 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/10/25/donald-trump-
migrant-caravan-could-help-gop-midterms/1742669002/. 
14. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 26, 2018, 3:19 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1067015026995879937. 
15. Nancy A. Youssef & Alicia A. Caldwell, Trump to Deploy 5,200 Troops to 
Southern Border, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2018, 1:44 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/military-to-deploy-5-000-troops-to-southern-border-u-
s-officials-say-1540820650.  
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year budget, leading to the longest government shutdown in history.16  
On January 8, 2019, in his first primetime speech to the nation, 
President Trump characterized illegal immigrants as brutal killers 
responsible for thousands of American deaths. 17  He then went on to 
describe in detail a number of heinous acts allegedly committed by 
undocumented migrants.18  After Trump’s speech, many feared he 
would declare a national emergency to justify allocating funds for a 
border wall.  Indeed, on February 15, 2018, less than twenty-four hours 
after Congress passed a funding measure without the requested border 
wall funds, Trump declared a national emergency at the southern U.S. 
border, citing “an invasion of drugs and criminals coming into our 
country.”19 
Many political pundits believe President Trump’s ability to deliver 
on his much touted border wall promises will decide his presidential 
legacy and his chances of re-election.20  President Trump’s attack on 
Central American migrants in the name of border security continues 
unabated, regardless of whether or not southern border crossers are 
fleeing persecution or harm.21  President Trump’s need to justify the 
                                                          
16. Bender, supra note 2; see Wagner, Rocha & Wills, supra note 4.  
17. See, e.g., Full Transcripts: Trump’s Speech on Immigration and the 
Democratic Response, supra note 6.  
18. Id.  
19. Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency, and Provokes a 
Constitutional Clash, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.html; see also Olivia Paschal, Read 
President Trump’s Speech Declaring a National Emergency, ATLANTIC (Feb. 15, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/02/trumps-declaration-
national-emergency-full-text/582928/.  
20. See, e.g., Paul Waldman, Trump’s Reelection Campaign Just Got a Lot 
Tougher, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/2019/02/15/trumps-reelection-campaign-just-got-lot-tougher/; see also Jim 
Malone, Trump Sees Border Wall Promise as Key to Re-Election, VOICE OF AM. (Jan. 
9, 2019, 8:55 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/donald-trump-sees-border-wall-
promise-as-key-to-re-election/4736039.html (explaining Trump’s view of his border 
wall promise and the reactions or views of opposing Democrats and conservative 
supporters).  
21. See, e.g., Hamed Aleaziz, Trump’s Claim That Migrants ‘Infest’ Country 
Seen as Whipping Up Fear, S.F. CHRON. (June 19, 2018, 9:18 PM), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Trump-s-claim-that-migrants-infest-
13008615.php?psid=7eyDQ; Bart Jansen & Alan Gomez, President Trump Calls 
Caravan Immigrants ‘Stone Cold Criminals.’ Here’s What We Know., USA TODAY 
6
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construction of a southern border wall, in order to fulfill campaign 
promises and secure re-election, has led to the implementation or 
continuation of official policies and de facto practices that serve to 
bolster Trump’s self-serving rhetoric.  As the idea of a border wall 
continues to prove politically infeasible, Trump has doubled-down on 
the migrant “border crisis” and sought to enact other hardline 
immigration reforms to solidify political support in the run-up to the 
2020 presidential elections.22  However, many of these policies and 
practices have also resulted in the wide scale violation of the rights of 
asylum seekers. 
II.  INTERNATIONAL LAW OBLIGATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES’ 
APPROACH TO ASYLUM SEEKERS 
The right to seek asylum is a fundamental human right.23  
According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “[e]veryone 
has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution.”24  Under international law, a refugee or asylum seeker25 
is anyone who holds a well-founded fear of persecution based on their 
                                                          
(Dec. 6, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/11/26/ 
president-trump-migrant-caravan-criminals/2112846002/; David Nakamura, Trump 
Says the Border Crisis Is About Criminals and Gangs. His Administration Says It Is 
About Families and Children., WASH. POST (May 1, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-the-border-crisis-is-about-
criminals-and-gangs-his-administration-says-it-is-about-families-and-
children/2019/05/01/0f94d78c-6c37-11e9-8f44-
e8d8bb1df986_story.html?utm_term=.bd04e398af8b. 
22. Abigail Abrams, Trump Is Again Considering Dramatic Action on 
Immigration. Here’s Why, TIME (Apr. 9, 2019), https://time.com/5566328/donald-
trump-immigration-policies/.   
23. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14 (Dec. 
10, 1948).  
24. Id.  
25. The terms “refugee” and “asylum seeker” or “asylee” are often used 
interchangeably. A refugee is someone who has fled persecution in his or her home 
country and has been recognized as a refugee in the process; “[a]n asylum seeker is 
someone who is also seeking international protection from dangers in his or her home 
country, but whose claim for refugee status hasn’t been determined legally.” For more 
information, see Int’l Rescue Comm., Migrants, Asylum Seekers, Refugees and 
Immigrants: What’s the Difference?, RESCUE (Dec. 11, 2018), 
https://www.rescue.org/article/migrants-asylum-seekers-refugees-and-immigrants-
whats-difference.   
7
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race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion in their home country, and who is unable or unwilling 
to return to that country because of this fear. 26  Refugee status is 
declaratory in nature, meaning any individual who meets the 
requirements is a refugee, regardless of whether this status has been 
formally recognized or not.27  A State or international organization does 
not have to formally recognize an individual as a refugee before special 
protections apply.28  Although no State has a duty to grant asylum,29 
once an asylum seeker enters the territory, several international law 
protections arise under various treaties and in customary international 
law.  The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 
Refugee Convention) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1967 Refugee Protocol) lay out the majority of these 
obligations.30  The following section briefly outlines the United States’ 
international law obligations to asylum seekers and how the U.S. 
government has interpreted these obligations domestically. 
A.  International Law Obligations to Asylum Seekers 
1.  The Non-Refoulement Principle 
Although international law does not obligate States to grant asylum 
to refugees within their borders, it expressly prohibits States from 
returning refugees to the country in which they fear persecution on a 
protected ground.31  This principle, known as non-refoulement, is well 
                                                          
26. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Convention and Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1 (Dec. 2010) [hereinafter Convention and 
Protocol] (referencing G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI), Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2198 (Dec. 16, 1966)). 
27. UNHCR, Note on Determination of Refugee Status Under International 
Instruments, paras. 2-3, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/5 (Aug. 24, 1977), 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/scip/3ae68cc04/note-determination-refugee-
status-under-international-instruments.html.  
28. UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-
Refoulement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol, para. 6 (Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter UNHCR, 
Advisory Opinion], https://www.unhcr.org/4d9486929.pdf.   
29. See id. para. 8.   
30. See Convention and Protocol, supra note 26.  
31. Id. art. 33(1).  
8
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defined and established in international law.32  Specifically, the 1951 
Refugee Convention states that “[n]o Contracting State shall expel or 
return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account 
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.”33  This section of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention was also incorporated into the 1967 Refugee Protocol.34  
Various other legal instruments have also codified non-refoulement 
obligations at the international and regional levels, and the obligations 
are widely accepted as part of customary international law.35  
Consequently, non-refoulement obligations bind all States, not just 
those signatory to treaties that require compliance with non-
refoulement. 36  Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention envisions 
limited exceptions to this principle; specifically, a State may return a 
refugee if there are “reasonable grounds” that the refugee is a security 
threat to the country in which he or she seeks refuge.37  However, under 
customary international law, State obligations do not allow any 
derogation from the non-refoulement principle, which therefore, bars 
all signatories from applying Article 33 exceptions.38 
a.  Non-Rejection 
It is also widely accepted that the non-refoulement principle 
includes the obligation of “non-rejection” at the border. 39  In practice, 
non-rejection means that asylum seekers who intend to enter a state 
seeking protection may not be turned away before entering that state’s 
territory.40 Non-rejection was first included as part of non-refoulement 
                                                          
32. See Convention and Protocol, supra note 26; UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, 
supra note 28.  
33. Convention and Protocol, supra note 26, art. 33(1).  
34. Id. art. 1.  
35. See generally UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, supra note 28 (e.g., the 1969 
OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 
1969 American Convention on Human Rights).   
36. Id. para. 15 n.30.   
37. Convention and Protocol, supra note 26, art. 33(2).  
38. See UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, paras. 12, 16 n.35.  
39. See id. paras. 13 n.27, 16 n.36.  
40. See id. para. 13 n.27.  
9
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in the 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum.41  Later, the obligation 
was also included in non-refoulement provisions codified at the 
regional level in the 1969 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees and in the 
1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa.42  Most recently, the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (High Commissioner) stated 
that non-rejection is implicit in the ordinary meaning of “refouler” and 
that a territorial limitation on non-refoulement, meaning the protection 
only applied to individuals within a country’s borders, and not at the 
frontiers of its borders, would run counter to the “overriding 
humanitarian object and purpose of the [1951 Refugee] Convention.”43 
b.  Access to Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures 
Once a refugee is present in another country seeking asylum, 
additional protections under international law attach. In order to comply 
with their non-refoulement obligations, all States, regardless of their 
treaty obligations, must ensure that they do not return or expel 
individuals who self-identify as refugees before they have made a final 
determination of the individuals’ status.44  The Refugee Convention 
provides greater guidance to signatory States.  “As a general rule, . . . 
[contracting] States [must] grant individuals seeking international 
                                                          
41. See G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), Declaration on Territorial Asylum, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2312(XII), art. 3 (Dec. 14, 1967).  
42. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International 
Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico, and Panama, OAS (Nov. 22, 
1984), https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_cartagena_declaration_on_refugees.pdf; 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), Convention Governing the Specific Aspects 
of Refugee Problems in Africa, art. II (3), June 20, 1974, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45 
[hereinafter OAU Convention].  
43. See UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, para. 30; see also Brief of 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Respondents at 5-6, McNary v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 506 U.S. 
814 (1992) (No. 92-344) (“urg[ing] the Court to affirm the decision of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit striking down the Executive Branch’s 
policy of blocking the flight of Haitian refugees and returning them against their will 
to the country from which they fled” because the plain meaning of Article 33 and the 
1951 Refugee’s Convention clearly supports that non-refoulement protections apply 
to State conduct, regardless of whether the conduct occurs inside or outside of the 
State’s borders).  
44. UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, paras. 2, 6, 15.  
10
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protection access to the territory and to fair and efficient asylum 
procedures” to effectuate their international law obligations.45  
Additionally, contracting States cannot impose penalties on asylum 
seekers who illegally enter their country, “provided [the asylum 
seekers] present themselves without delay to the authorities and show 
good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”46  Essentially, under 
international law, if a self-identified asylum seeker enters a State, with 
or without permission, that individual is entitled to remain in that 
country, pending a fair and efficient process to establish his or her 
refugee status. 
B.  U.S. Interpretations of International Obligations 
The United States is a party to the 1967 Refugee Protocol, which 
incorporates the substantive articles of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
including the provisions relating to non-refoulement and non-penalties 
for unlawful entrants.47  Additionally, under customary international 
law, the United States, like all States regardless of their treaty 
obligations, is bound by the principle of non-refoulement.48  In 1980, 
following its accession to the 1967 Refugee Protocol, the United States 
overhauled its refugee system by passing the Refugee Act, which 
amended the earlier Immigration and Nationality Act and the Migration 
and Refugee Assistance Act.49  The 1980 Refugee Act incorporated the 
1951 Refugee Convention definition of refugee and the principle of 
non-refoulement into U.S. law.50  However, the United States has 
interpreted its international law obligations to refugees in a manner 
counter to or violative of prevailing interpretations of international law, 
particularly by repudiating the non-rejection principle, inflicting 
                                                          
45. Id. para. 8.  
46. Convention and Protocol, supra note 26, art. 31(1). 
47. Id.; UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b73b0d63.pdf 
(providing data as of July 2019).  
48. UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, paras. 14-16 (on non-
refoulement being customary international law).  
49. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Westlaw 2019)).  
50. Id. §§ 201(a), 203(h)(1).  
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punitive measures upon illegal entrants, and employing expedited 
removal procedures. 
1. Exclusion of the Non-Rejection Principle 
Regarding its non-refoulement obligations, the United States does 
not recognize the non-rejection principle (the prohibition on turning 
away potential asylum seekers before they reach U.S. territory).51  
Instead, the United States follows the absolute State sovereignty 
approach, meaning that only once a refugee is present on U.S. territory, 
is the United States required to ensure he or she is not returned to a 
country of origin in which he or she fears persecution or torture.52  The 
United States first adopted a policy of interdicting potential asylum 
seekers in the 1990s, following the large influx of Haitian individuals 
attempting to reach the United States by boat.53  President George H.W. 
Bush’s Executive Order 12807 allowed U.S. Coast Guard officials to 
intercept and return boats of potential Haitian refugees without first 
assessing the refugees’ fear of torture or persecution if returned to 
Haiti.54  In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of this interdiction and gave 
constitutional validity to the United States’ minority position against 
non-rejection.55  The United States’ position of rejecting potential 
                                                          
51. See Alice Farmer, Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror 
Measures That Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 15-16 (2008); 
see generally UNHCR, Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High 
Commissioner), U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/2 (Aug. 23, 1977) [hereinafter UNHCR, Note on 
Non-Refoulement], https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-non-
refoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html (discussing the principle of non-
rejection). 
52. See Interdiction of Illegal Aliens, Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 
23,133 (May 24, 1992); see also Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 
159 (1993) (holding that “neither § 243(h)(1) [of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952] nor Article 33 of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees applies to action taken by the Coast Guard on the high seas,” where 
Executive Order 12807 language allowed the United States to turn away Haitian 
passengers before determining their refugee status). 
53. Christina C. De Matteis, Forced Return of Haitian Migrants Under 
Executive Order 12,807: A Violation of Domestic and International Law, 18 N.C. J. 
INT’L & COM. REG. 431, 434-35 (Winter 1993).  
54. Id. at 440. See Exec. Order No. 12,807, supra note 52. 
55. See generally Sale, 509 U.S. 155.  
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asylum seekers before they have reached U.S. territory runs counter to 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ 
understanding of non-refoulement and customary international law.56 
2. Punitive Measures for Illegal Entrants 
The United States’ immigration policy also derogates from 
international law standards by criminalizing asylum seekers who cross 
the U.S. border without inspection.  This policy contravenes the 1951 
Refugee Convention Article 31 protections against penalization.57  
Under U.S. law, individuals may be charged with a misdemeanor 
punishable by a fine, up to six months imprisonment, or both, for the 
following reasons: (1) entering the United States between ports of entry, 
(2) avoiding examination or inspection by CBP, or (3) making false 
statements to CBP while entering or attempting to enter the United 
States.58  Additionally, individuals may be charged with a felony 
punishable by up to two years imprisonment if they are found to have 
illegally re-entered, either by attempting to unlawfully re-enter or by 
being found in the United States after having been deported, ordered 
removed, or denied admission.59  Finally, migrants with criminal 
records who re-enter illegally may be punished with up to twenty years 
imprisonment.60  The criminal code makes no exception for asylum 
seekers who may have good cause for entering the United States 
without inspection.61 
                                                          
56. See UNHCR, Note on Non-Refoulement, supra note 51; see also Farmer, 
supra note 51, at 15-16 (“In the U.S., an individual may be barred from asylum or 
refugee status under several different provisions, which are cumulatively broader than 
those articulated in the 1951 Convention. The United States is, in effect, considering 
refugee status determination and protection from refoulement (referred to as 
‘withholding of removal’) at the same time, in a manner that improperly conflates two 
parts of the 1951 Convention.”). 
57. See Convention and Protocol, supra note 26.  
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1996).  
59. Id. § 1325(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1996).  
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2) (1996).  
61. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325, 1326 (1996). 
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3. Expedited Removal and the Credible Fear Process 
The expedited removal process is another policy that abrogates the 
United States’ international law obligation of non-refoulement.  
Expedited removal was established by the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) in response to the 
mass migration of Cubans and Haitians to the United States in the early 
1980s.62  The expedited removal procedure empowers low-level 
immigration officers, usually CBP agents, to order the deportation of 
certain non-citizens following a brief screening of eligibility.63  
Originally, expedited removal only applied to individuals arriving at 
ports of entry without proper documentation; however, in the early 
2000s the procedure was expanded to include anyone “who [is] present 
in the U.S. without having been admitted or paroled following 
inspection by an immigration officer at a designated port-of-entry, who 
[is] encountered by an immigration officer within 100 air miles of the 
U.S. international land border” within fourteen days of entry into the 
United States.64  Consequently, this policy applies to most southern 
border crossers who are either detained at a port of entry or who are 
found after having entered without inspection. 
In the expedited removal process, an immigration officer can 
summarily order an individual be deported from the United States, 
without giving that individual the opportunity to speak with an 
immigration judge.65  The expedited removal procedure mandates that 
upon arrival or detention, a CBP agent screen an individual for 
admissibility.66  The examining immigration officer must inform the 
individual of his or her rights and take a written record of the 
proceedings.67  If the CBP officer determines the individual is 
                                                          
62. A Primer on Expedited Removal, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Feb. 2017), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/a_primer_o
n_expedited_removal.pdf.  See H.R. REP. NO. 104-828 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see 
generally Aliens and Nationality, 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (2017); Ruth Ellen Wasem, U.S. 
Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (May 17, 2011), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21349.pdf.  
63. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3 (2017).  
64. See Notices, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877-81 (Aug. 11, 2004).  
65. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (2017); see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2008). 
66. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2) (2017). 
67. Id. § 235.3(b)(2).   
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inadmissible, meaning there are no legal grounds for the person to enter 
the United States, then the officer will issue a deportation order.68  
However, if during this brief interview, an individual indicates intent to 
apply for asylum or expresses a fear of return to his or her country of 
origin, then the individual cannot be summarily deported.69  The 
individual must be referred to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS), where he or she enters the “credible fear” process.70  
For many individuals, this extremely brief screening with a CBP officer 
may be the only opportunity to speak with a U.S. government official 
regarding his or her fear of returning to his or her home country.  That 
reality leads to deep concerns about asylum seekers being wrongfully 
deported. 
In the credible fear process, potential asylum seekers are given the 
opportunity to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum through an 
interview with an asylum officer.71  During this interview, the asylum 
officer assesses whether the individual has a “credible fear” of 
persecution or torture.72  An individual has a credible fear if “there is a 
significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the 
statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such 
other facts as are known to the officer, [that] the alien can establish 
eligibility for asylum . . . or [a basis for] withholding of removal.”73  If 
an asylum officer determines an individual has a credible fear, then the 
individual is taken out of the expedited removal process and is referred 
to the immigration court for a standard removal hearing.74  At this 
hearing, an individual may apply for asylum and can develop a full 
record of the merits of his or her asylum claim with the help of a legal 
representative.75  If an asylum claim is denied, an individual may appeal 
the immigration judge’s (IJ) decision to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA).76  This standard removal hearing should be provided to 
                                                          
68. Id.  
69. Id. § 235.3(b)(4). 
70. See id. § 235.3(b)(4)(i).  
71. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(1)-(2) (2019); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (2008). 
72. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(e)(1) (2019).  
73. Id. § 208.30(e)(2).  
74. See id. § 208.30(e)(7)(f).  
75. Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1)-(2) (2015). 
76. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.53 (2003). 
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any potential asylum seeker under international law; however, 
individuals placed in expedited removal must first prevail in a credible 
fear interview before accessing a full removal hearing.77  The expedited 
removal process risks sending bona fide asylum seekers back to a 
country in which they fear persecution, torture, or death, without a 
chance at a full and fair hearing before an immigration judge. 
III.  THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL THE 
BORDER NARRATIVE 
As described in Part II, various aspects of U.S. immigration law do 
not align with the United States’ international law obligations toward 
asylum seekers.  Although these aberrations predate the current 
administration, the Administration’s recent policy changes have sought 
to capitalize upon existing legal structures to propagate a politically 
motivated mischaracterization of southern border crossers—further 
undermining the rights of asylum seekers.  These official policies and 
condoned unofficial practices include: (1) denials at ports of entry, (2) 
CBP intimidation and/or corruption during admissibility screenings, (3) 
increased prosecution of illegal border crossers, and (4) attempted 
policy changes to the credible fear process. 
A. Port of Entry Denials 
Adhering to its restricted interpretation of non-refoulement 
obligations, the United States maintains that it may intercept potential 
asylum seekers before they reach the U.S. border and that it may refuse 
entry even if the individuals’ purpose is to seek asylum.78  This 
rejection has traditionally been applied to individuals attempting to 
access the United States by boat.79  In recent years, reports and first-
                                                          
77. UNHCR, Advisory Opinion, supra note 28, para. 8 (“As a general rule, in 
order to give effect to their obligations under the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 
Protocol, States will be required to grant individuals seeking international protection 
access to the territory and to fair and efficient asylum procedures.”) (emphasis added); 
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii)(I) (2008).  
78. See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).  
79. See id. at 164; see generally De Matteis, supra note 53 (discussing the 
Haitian political upheaval, the resulting mass Haitian migration, the United States’ 
response, the resulting legal battle in Haitian Centers Council, and the impact of that 
case decision).  
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hand accounts have illustrated CBP officials are increasingly 
intercepting asylum seekers at legal ports of entry before they reach the 
U.S. border and turning them away, or forcing them to wait days or 
weeks before allowing them to approach the port of entry.80  The uptick 
of this practice has been notable since Trump’s election in November 
2016 and appears to be a de facto policy of the current administration.81 
Significantly, a May 2017 Human Rights First report documented 
125 instances of CBP officials unlawfully refusing access to U.S. ports 
of entry to individuals seeking asylum in the border regions of 
California, Texas, and Arizona.82  In Texas specifically, these 
“turnbacks” have also been documented all across the southern border 
in the border cities of Brownsville, El Paso, Laredo, McAllen, Nogales, 
and Reynosa.83  U.S. border officials have employed various tactics to 
turn back asylum seekers. Some individuals have been lied to by some 
CBP officials with a vast array of falsehoods, including that the United 
States is no longer accepting asylum seekers, that the United States is 
no longer accepting individuals from their country, or that the U.S. 
border is altogether closed.84  Others have been told they are not 
allowed to seek asylum at certain smaller ports of entry, and they are 
redirected to larger U.S. ports of entry sometimes “as far as 50 miles 
away.”85  Additionally, some immigration attorneys working near the 
                                                          
80. See, e.g., B. SHAW DRAKE ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, CROSSING THE 
LINE: U.S. BORDER AGENTS ILLEGALLY REJECT ASYLUM SEEKERS 1, 20 (May 2017); 
see generally AMNESTY INT’L, USA: ‘YOU DON’T HAVE ANY RIGHTS HERE’: 
ILLEGAL PUSHBACKS, ARBITRARY DETENTION, AND ILL-TREATMENT OF ASYLUM-
SEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2018) (discussing, among other policy effects, the 
“mass illegal pushbacks of asylum-seekers at the US-Mexico border . . . [and arguing 
that it is a practice] indisputably intended to deter asylum-seekers from requesting 
protection in the United States, as well as to punish and compel those who did seek 
protection to give up their asylum claims”).  
81. See DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 5; see also AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 
80, at 5, 17-22.  
82. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 1, 7.  
83. AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N., AILA POLICY BRIEF: NEW BARRIERS 
AT THE BORDER IMPEDE DUE PROCESS AND ACCESS TO ASYLUM 3 (June 1, 2018) 
[hereinafter AILA POLICY BRIEF].  
84. See DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 5-6. 
85. ADAM ISACSON ET AL., WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM., “COME BACK 
LATER”: CHALLENGES FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS WAITING AT PORTS OF ENTRY 5 
(August 2018).  
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border at Hidalgo, Texas, reported CBP officials were telling asylum 
seekers, “Trump says we don’t have to let you in.”86 
Even if individuals are not turned back, they still face additional 
barriers to entry. Some individuals have been forced to wait days or 
even weeks to access a legal port of entry, under the guise of “a lack of 
processing capacity.”87  For example, in April and May of 2018, CBP 
officials denied entry to migrant caravan members at the San Ysidro 
port of entry near San Diego, California, forcing them to sleep outside 
in dangerous conditions for up to six days.88  Asylum seekers in 
Arizona and Texas have been told that certain ports of entry are “full,” 
which local advocates contend are fabricated capacity issues.89  Since 
2017, the Dilley Pro Bono Project recorded more than 130 instances in 
which family units attempting to seek asylum in the United States were 
denied at ports of entry; some mothers and their children waited up to 
eighteen days outside of a port, with no access to food, water, or toilets, 
before being allowed entry.90 
For many vulnerable asylum seekers, waiting outside of a port of 
entry for CBP to allow access is a dire proposition.  Those waiting at 
the border face extreme heat and a lack of food, water, and protection 
from the elements.91  Individuals waiting outside of ports of entry or in 
migrant shelters in border towns are also easy targets for organized 
criminal groups that engage in kidnapping, exploitation, and 
trafficking.92  As a result of these illegal border rejections, many asylum 
seekers have chosen to attempt dangerous unauthorized border 
crossings outside of an official port of entry.93  Mexican drug cartels 
control the majority of irregular border crossings across the Rio Grande 
River, and they require that individuals pay large fees to cartel members 
                                                          
86. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 5.  
87. AILA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 83, at 3; see AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 
80, at 14-20.  
88. See AILA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 83, at 3.   
89. ISACSON ET AL., supra note 85, at 4-5.  
90. Interview with Katy Murzda, Advocacy Coordinator, Dilley Pro Bono 
Project (on file with author). 
91. See ISACSON ET AL., supra note 85, at 4.  
92. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 5, 16-17. 
93. Interview with Katy Murzda, supra note 90. 
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for passage.94  Asylum seekers have reported that while attempting to 
cross the border, cartel members extorted, trafficked, and raped them.95  
Many of these illegal crossings involve traversing extremely dangerous 
portions of the Rio Grande River.  Immigration advocates in the Rio 
Grande Valley have reported “an increase in the number of drownings” 
since CBP officials at the Hidalgo port of entry began refusing asylum 
seekers entry.96 
The increased number of border rejections under the Trump 
Administration has led to more asylum seekers entering the United 
States without passing through a legal port of entry.97  The 
Administration has attempted to capitalize on this new trend, referring 
                                                          
94. See generally Jay Root, How One Migrant Family Got Caught Between 
Smugglers, the Cartel and Trump’s Zero-Tolerance Policy, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2019, 
6:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/03/07/migration-us-border-
generating-billions-smugglers/ (explaining that the global smuggling trade is “a 
system that runs on people . . . who are willing to carve up their meager assets to pay 
off a sophisticated network of smugglers, cartels, stash houses, drivers, and lookouts 
[and that] [i]t’s like a cake . . . [because] [e]veryone gets their little piece”). Root 
provides an example of a smuggler who provides three different package deals to be 
smuggled, at prices similar to other smugglers. The VIP plan involves driving one 
individual to Houston and costs $10,000. The second deal costs $7,500 and is a two-
part process. First, “single adults are delivered to the border, . . . “[then] they make 
their own way by foot around a checkpoint 80 miles north of it before getting picked 
back up.” The last deal is “the popular bargain-basement deal: for $6,000, [the 
smuggler] will arrange to deposit a parent and child on the U.S. side of a South Texas 
riverbank, at which point they are left to turn themselves in to U.S. border officials 
and claim asylum.” Id.; Nicholas Kulish, What It Costs to Be Smuggled Across the 
U.S. Border, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/30/world/smuggling-illegal-
immigration-costs.html (describing how cartels kill migrants who attempt to cross 
legally or without paying them to cross).  
95. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 1, 16-18. See generally WASH. OFFICE ON 
LATIN AM., LATIN AM. WORKING GRP. EDUC. FUND & KINO BORDER INITIATIVE, 
SITUATION OF IMPUNITY AND VIOLENCE IN MEXICO’S NORTHERN BORDER REGION 1 
(2017), https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Situation-of-Impunity-
and-Violence-in-Mexicos-northern-border-LAWG-WOLA-KBI.pdf (arguing that the 
situation of crimes against migrants “is compounded by ineffective responses by 
Mexican authorities to investigate and prosecute [those] crimes and other human 
rights violations”). 
96. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 15.  
97. Id. at 14.  
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to illegal border crossers as criminals and false asylum seekers. 98  In 
November 2018, President Trump issued an order seeking to block any 
individual from applying for asylum who entered the United States 
illegally.99  This attempted asylum ban was immediately challenged in 
court by immigrant advocacy groups and struck down by the U.S. 
District Court of Northern California.100 
Asylum seekers and immigration advocates are also challenging the 
Administration’s turn back policy.  In July 2017, in Al Otro Lado v. 
Kelly, Al Otro Lado brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of six 
asylum seekers and all others similarly situated against John F. Kelly, 
in Kelly’s official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security, alleging that the CBP’s practice of turning back (“metering”) 
the number of asylum seekers allowed to enter via ports of entry 
violates domestic law.101  The lawsuit claims “high level CBP officials, 
under the direction or with the knowledge or authorization of [U.S. 
government officials], adopted a formal policy to restrict access to the 
asylum process at [ports of entry] by mandating that lower-level 
officials directly or constructively turn back asylum seekers at the 
border.”102  The court decided this case on August 20, 2018.103 
Most recently, reports indicate that many asylum seekers are no 
longer attempting to cross at legal ports of entry given their fears of 
                                                          
98. See Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,661 (Nov. 15, 2018).  
99. Dara Lind, Trump Signs a 90-Day Asylum Ban for Border Crossers, VOX 
(Nov. 9, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/8/18076510/ asylum-
trump-border-caravan.  
100. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Immigration Action at 1, 
E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 
3:18-cv-06810); Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order; Order to Show Cause 
Re Preliminary Injunction, E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 
1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 3:18-cv-06810-JST); Maria Sacchetti & Sarah Kinosian, 
Trump Lashes Out at Judge After Order to Allow Illegal Border Crossers to Seek 
Asylum, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/judges-ruling-means-trump-
administration-must-allow-illegal-border-crossers-to-seek-
asylum/2018/11/20/1aebd608-ecc1-11e8-96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html.  
101. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-3, 16-17, Al Otro 
Lado, Inc. v. Kelly, No. 2:17-cv-05111 (C.D. Cal. filed July 12, 2017).  
102. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Al 
Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, 327 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 3:17-cv-
02366-BAS-KSC).   
103. Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, 327 F. Supp.  3d 1284 (S.D. Cal. 2018).  
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rejection or long wait times, which are likely exacerbated following the 
Administration’s announcement of its “Migrant Protection Protocols” 
(MPP), colloquially referred to as the “Remain in Mexico” policy.”104  
The MPP forces asylum seekers who have been admitted at legal ports 
of entry to return to Mexico to wait potentially months or years for their 
asylum claims to be adjudicated in the United States.105 
This policy is being challenged by the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) “on behalf of eleven asylum seekers . . . and [six] 
organizations that seek to assist them.”106  Despite clear evidence that 
current policies directly caused an increase in irregular border crossings 
by refusing entry to asylum seekers at legal ports of entry, the 
Administration continues to characterize individuals who cross outside 
of legal ports of entry as illegitimate asylum seekers. 107  CBP data 
shows illegal border crossings rose ten percent between October 2017 
and January 2018, whereas entries at legal ports of entry dropped by ten 
                                                          
104. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Migrant Protection Protocols 
(Jan. 24, 2019) [hereinafter MPP], https://www.dhs.gov/news/ 2019/01/24/migrant-
protection-protocols; Memorandum from Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., to L. Francis Cissna, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 
Kevin K. McAleenan, Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, & Ronald D. 
Vitiello, Deputy Dir. and Senior Official Performing the Duties of Dir., U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement  (Jan. 25, 2019) [hereinafter January Memo], 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrant-
protection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf; Camilo Montoya-Galvez & Angel 
Canales, More than 10,000 Asylum Seekers Returned Under “Remain in Mexico” as 
U.S. Set to Expand Policy, CBS NEWS (June 8, 2019, 9:17 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/remain-in-mexico-asylum-seekers-returned-as-us-
seeks-to-expand-policy-2019-06-08/. See DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 1-2, 15-16.   
105. Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, Risky ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy Faces Legal 
Challenges, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Feb. 21, 2019), 
http://immigrationimpact.com/2019/02/21/remain-in-mexico-policy-legal-
challenges/; MPP, supra note 104, at 4; January Memo, supra note 104, at 1.   
106. Reichlin-Melnick, supra note 105 (summarizing the ACLU’s main 
arguments); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1-2, Innovation Law 
Lab v. Nielsen 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 3:19-cv-00807).  
107. Julia Ainsley, Since Trump Restricted Flow at Border, More Migrants 
Trying to Sneak Through Undetected, NBC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019, 1:33 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/trump-restricted-flow-border-more-
migrants-trying-sneak-through-undetected-n976356. See Alyssa Isidoridy, FAQ: Why 
Do Asylum Seekers Cross the U.S. Border Between Ports of Entry?, HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIRST (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/ faq-why-do-asylum-
seekers-cross-us-border-between-ports-entry.  
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percent. 108  The Department of Homeland Security’s response was that 
“[t]he fact that illegitimate asylum seekers may be abandoning efforts 
at our [ports of entry] (sic) means that legitimate asylum seekers at the 
[ports of entry] (sic) can receive protections far more quickly — which 
has been our goal from the start.”109  This characterization of who is 
choosing to cross outside of legal ports of entry is oversimplified. 
B. CBP Abuse at the Border 
Once potential asylum seekers present themselves at a port of entry 
or are detained by U.S. officials along the border, CBP officials screen 
them for admissibility to enter the United States.  Under U.S. law, this 
screening must include assessing whether an individual fears returning 
to his or her home country.110  Only after an asylum seeker is able to 
convey a fear of return will he or she be granted the right to speak with 
an asylum officer or immigration judge regarding his or her desire to 
seek asylum in the United States.  However, recent reports and firsthand 
accounts highlight various corrupt practices that CBP officials have 
undertaken to deny asylum seekers the right to apply for protection in 
the United States.111  These practices include intimidation, 
misinformation, and falsification of records. 
At the outset, it must be stated that independent of reported CBP 
abuse of power, the practice of preliminarily screening for fear of return 
at a border holding facility implicates various due process concerns.  
For example, often, individuals in CBP custody have just completed an 
extremely treacherous and arduous journey.  They may be disoriented, 
malnourished, ill, or confused.  Trauma-related barriers to discussing 
fear of return and/or distrust of CBP officials may inhibit these 
individuals’ ability to give testimony.  To make matters worse, these 
preliminary screening interviews are sometimes conducted in settings 
where a lack of privacy may also discourage an individual from 
                                                          
108. Ainsley, supra note 107.  
109. Id.  
110. Inadmissible Aliens and Expedited Removal, 8 C.F.R. §§ 235.3(b)(2)(i), 
(b)(4) (2017). 
111. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 1-2, 5-8. See, e.g., Complaint, Jose Crespo 
Cagnant v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-22267 (S.D. Fla. filed June 7, 2018) 
[hereinafter Cagnant Complaint].  
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discussing past persecution and his or her intent to apply for asylum.112  
Additionally, asylum seekers at the border are not allowed to speak with 
a lawyer or a legal representative before their CBP screening 
interview.113  Finally, mistreatment by CBP officials can create distrust 
and confusion, which can lead individuals to withhold information that 
may prove critical to their opportunity to seek asylum in the United 
States.114 
Even if asylum seekers did not face these basic barriers and could 
narrate their claims for asylum completely, various reports and studies 
show how CBP corruption has obstructed the claims of legitimate 
asylum seekers. 115  U.S. officials deprive many immigrants of their 
legal rights in the following ways: (1) failing to provide them with 
legally required information in a language of their understanding, to 
inquire about their fear of return, or to acknowledge their expressed 
fear; (2) falsifying records; and (3) intimidating and coercing asylum 
                                                          
112. AILA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 83, at 4.  
113. See, e.g., SARA CAMPOS & GUILLERMO CANTOR, AM. IMMIGRATION 
COUNCIL, DEPORTATIONS IN THE DARK: LACK OF PROCESS AND INFORMATION IN THE 
REMOVAL OF MEXICAN MIGRANTS 8, 11 (Sept. 2017) [hereinafter CAMPOS & 
CANTOR].  
114. See id. at 12-13.  
115. Id. at 13. See Letter from Keren Zwick, from the Nat’l Immigrant Justice 
Ctr., Stephanie Taylor, from Am. Gateways, Kate Voigt, from Am. Immigration 
Lawyers Ass’n, Karen Musalo & Lisa Frydman, from the Ctr. for Gender & Refugee 
Studies at U.C., Hastings Coll. of the Law, Eleni Wolfe Roubatis, from Centro de la 
Raza Legal, Eleanor Acer, from Human Rights First, Robin Goldfaden, from 
Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights of the S.F. Bay Area, Amelia Fischer, from Tex. 
Civil Rights Project, Denise L. Gilman, from Immigration Clinic, Univ. of Tex. Law 
Sch., & Katharina Obser, from Women’s Refugee Comm’n, to Megan H. Mack, 
Officer of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & John Roth, 
Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Inadequate U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) Screening Practices Block Individuals Fleeing Persecution from 
Access to the Asylum Process (Nov. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Letter to Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec.]; see, e.g., Cagnant Complaint, supra note 111; see generally 
ELIZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN 
EXPEDITED REMOVAL (2016) (providing a follow up report to USCIRF’s 2005 Report 
on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal that reviews public information and 
examines field research between 2012 and 2015 to examine the recent expedited 
removal process, notably revealing DHS’ failure to effectuate a majority of the 2005 
recommendations).  
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seekers to recant their stated fear or accept deportation.116  These abuses 
are not new; however, they continue unabated in the Trump era.117 
CBP agents are legally required to screen for asylum seekers at the 
border118 and must ask the following questions verbatim to each 
individual screened for admissibility: 
(1) Why did you leave your home country or country of last 
residence? 
(2) Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to your 
home country or being removed from the United States? 
(3) Would you be harmed if you are returned to your home country 
or country of residence? 
(4) Do you have any questions or is there anything else you would 
like to add?119 
The responses to these admissibility questions must be recorded on 
Form I-867B.120  However, it appears that some CBP officials have 
made it a practice to falsify these documents in an attempt to keep 
asylum seekers from accessing protection in the United States. 
Many immigrants report they were never asked about their fear of 
return.121  In a survey of 600 Mexican nationals who were repatriated 
                                                          
116. CASSIDY & LYNCH, supra note 115, at 19-20, 27. See AMNESTY INT’L, 
supra note 80, at 30, 50; Letter to Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 115, at 21; see, 
e.g., CAMPOS & CANTOR, supra note 113, at 2, 4, 9; Cagnant Complaint, supra note 
111.  
117. See DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 1. Compare OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS & U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., STATISTICAL REPORT ON EXPEDITED 
REMOVAL, CREDIBLE FEAR, AND WITHDRAWAL, FY 2000-2003 (Feb. 2005) (seeking 
to determine whether CBP officers were improperly processing, removing, and 
detaining aliens who might be eligible for asylum admission), with Letter to Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., supra note 115 (providing examples of individuals attesting to not 
being asked about their fear, not having their fear acknowledged, and being coerced).  
118. CBP officials’ duty to screen asylum seekers starts with having to use Form 
1-867A, which requires the officer to state that U.S. law offers asylum to people facing 
persecution, harm, or torture if returned to their home country. Form 1-867A is 
reproduced in Letter to Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 115, at 7; see 8 C.F.R. § 
235.3(b)(2)(i) (2017) (stating that Form I-867A and I-867B must be used in 
determining admissibility).   
119. CBP officials must use Form 1-867B, reproduced in Letter to Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., supra note 115, at 7-8.   
120. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2017).  
121. See CAMPOS & CANTOR, supra note 113, at 5.   
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to Mexico between August 2016 and April 2017, 55.7% of the 
respondents reported that they were not asked if they feared returning 
to their home country.122  For these more than 300 individuals who were 
deported allegedly without having been screened for fear, CBP officials 
must create a transcript of the admissibility interview on 
Form I-867B.123  Meaning, records must exist to demonstrate whether 
these individuals stated to a CBP official that they had no fear of return.  
This raises legitimate concerns that transcripts are being falsified. 
Ongoing litigation in the case of Crespo Cagnant v. United States 
also helps to illustrate the types of corrupt actions allegedly being 
undertaken by CBP officials.  In June 2018, plaintiff Jose Crespo, an 
asylum seeker from Mexico, sued the U.S. government, claiming he had 
been wrongfully deported without the opportunity to express a fear of 
return.124  The case alleges that the CBP official who interviewed 
Crespo unlawfully prevented him from seeking asylum by falsifying 
information in the Form I-867B, including falsely stating, among other 
things, that Crespo was interviewed in Spanish, did not express a fear 
of return to Mexico, had never been to the United States, and had come 
to the United States “to live and work in McAllen, Texas.”125  However, 
Crespo alleges he was not interviewed in Spanish, but in English, and 
he never stated that he was not afraid to return to Mexico or that he had 
come to the United States to work in Texas.126  On the contrary, Crespo 
had previously lived and studied in Miami, Florida, and was returning 
to the United States for fear of persecution and to live with his partner 
in Miami while seeking asylum.127  This case is currently pending as of 
June 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
Florida.128 
                                                          
122. Id. at 1-2. 
123. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2017). Transcripts of an asylum seeker’s 
admissibility interview, recorded by CBP officers in Form I-867A & B, Record of 
Sworn Statement in Proceedings under Section 235(b)(1) of the Act, are included in 
an individual’s Alien File (“A” file) and are therefore available to asylum officers 
conducting credible fear interviews. 
124. Cagnant Complaint, supra note 111, at 1, 7.  
125. Id. at 7-10.  
126. Id.  
127. Id. at 5, 9.  
128. Notice of Appeal at 1, Jose Crespo Cagnant v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-
22267 (S.D. Fla. filed Mar. 13, 2019).  
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Furthermore, many asylum seekers who are asked about their fear 
of return are coerced or intimidated into recanting their fear.  A 2017 
Human Rights First report provides various examples of these 
tactics.129  In one instance, a Mexican family retracted its claim after 
CBP officials threatened to call Mexican police to jail the family 
members if they continued to claim fear of persecution by their 
government.130  Other asylum seekers report being forced to sign 
deportation documents or unknown papers instead of being allowed to 
proceed with their asylum claim, even after claiming fear of return.131  
In the American Immigration Lawyers Association/Programa de 
Defensa e Incidencia Binacional (AILA/PDIB) survey, 50.7% of 
respondents stated that “they were not allowed to read [their 
deportation] documents” before being forced to sign, and 58.1% stated 
that these forms were presented to them only in English.132  Many of 
these individuals did not understand they were accepting deportation 
despite continually expressing fear and/or intent to apply for asylum.133 
In instances where asylum seekers have successfully triggered the 
credible fear process during an admissibility screening, CBP officials 
are also reported to have falsified or mischaracterized border interview 
records to undermine legitimate asylum claims.  For example, “a CBP 
officer reportedly asked an asylum seeker, ‘What will you do if you are 
granted asylum in the United States? Work? Okay, so you are here to 
work.’”134  The CBP agent then recorded that the asylum seeker came 
to the United States for work, creating a false impression that the 
individual had not come to the United States out of fear. 135  In another 
well-known case, Matter of M-R-R-, CBP officials signed a sworn 
interview transcript with a three-year-old child that stated the child had 
supposedly left his home country “to look for work.”136  Given the 
                                                          
129. See, e.g., DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 11-12.  
130. Id. at 12. 
131. CAMPOS & CANTOR, supra note 113, at 7-11.  
132. Id. at 9.  
133. Id.   
134. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 80, at 12.  
135. Id. at 12.   
136. Elise Foley, Infants and Toddlers Are Coming to the U.S. to Work, 
According to Border Patrol, HUFFPOST (June 16, 2015), 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/border-patrol-babies_n_7594618.  
26
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol50/iss1/4
Woods camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/18/2020  12:00 PM 
2019]   HOW U.S. POLICIES AND PRACTICES ARE CONTROLLING THE BORDER 107 
child’s tender age, it is highly unlikely that these records reflected the 
true conversation conducted by the CBP official. 
While not all falsified information in admissibility transcripts can 
be said to have been made with malicious intent, Crespo Cagnant v. 
United States and Matter of M-R-R- both help to demonstrate CBP’s 
proclivity to falsify information regarding critical screening for asylum 
claims.  Although legal challenges such as these help to identify the 
types of material misrepresentations that are included in admissibility 
screening documents, the pervasiveness of falsified information 
remains unclear. 137  Deep concerns about CBP officials’ corrupt and 
abusive behavior during asylum screenings have continued unabated, 
although not unchallenged, for over a decade.138  Moreover, steps 
toward reform are unlikely during this administration.  On the contrary, 
the Trump Administration has attempted to enact policies in an apparent 
attempt to capitalize off of these common misstatements.  These 
policies are further discussed in subsection D, Policy Changes to the 
Credible Fear Process. 
C. Increased Prosecution of Illegal Border Crossers 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has a long tradition of prosecuting 
asylum seekers for illegal entry or reentry into the United States.  In 
2005, the DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
launched a joint initiative named Operation Streamline.  The initiative 
aimed to improve the efficiency of the process of referring individuals 
from the DHS to the DOJ for prosecution, following a DHS 
determination that the individual has entered the United States without 
inspection.139  As a result, a few years ago, “[i]llegal entry (under 8 
U.S.C. § 1235) and illegal re-entry (under 8 U.S.C. § 1326) [were] the 
most prosecuted federal crimes in the United States.”140  Historically, 
prosecution efforts focused on individuals who had illegally re-entered 
                                                          
137. In my own immigration practice, it is quite common for an individual in 
credible fear proceedings to have false statements recorded in their CBP admissibility 
screening transcript. 
138. See, e.g., Cagnant Complaint, supra note 111; Foley, supra note 136.  
139. Fact Sheet: Criminal Prosecutions for Unauthorized Border Crossing, 
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/other/operation-
streamline-issue-brief.   
140. Id.  
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the United States.141  Between 1992 and 2012, the number of 
individuals convicted for illegal re-entry increased by twenty-eight 
times, accounting for forty-eight percent of the total growth of overall 
federal convictions during this period.142  Prosecution of first time 
offenders was less prolific.143  As a policy, Operation Streamline makes 
no exception for border crossers who express a fear of persecution or 
torture if returned to their home country.144  In fact, the DHS Inspector 
General admitted that prosecution of asylum seekers under Operation 
Streamline was “inconsistent with and [possibly] violate[d] U.S. treaty 
obligations.”145  Indeed, some boilerplate plea agreements presented to 
illegal entrants and re-entrants required that they waive their right to 
apply for asylum or protection against persecution in their home 
country.146 
Recently, in April 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
announced a “zero-tolerance” policy for illegal entrants that called on 
U.S. Attorney’s Offices along the southern border to prosecute all 
referred cases for violations of 8 U.S.C. section 1325(a) “to the extent 
practicable.”147  This policy move was consistent with the 
Administration’s mischaracterization of southern border crossers as 
criminals.  The “zero-tolerance” policy meant federal prosecutors were 
encouraged to prosecute each and every asylum seeker who did not 
present themselves at a port of entry, regardless of whether these 
individuals had turned themselves over to CBP or had legitimate 
reasons for entering without inspection.  In announcing the new policy, 
Sessions stated that zero tolerance was necessary to address a crisis at 
                                                          
141. See Michael T. Light, The Rise of Federal Immigration Crimes: Unlawful 
Reentry Drives Growth, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 18, 2014), 
https://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/03/18/the-rise-of-federal-immigration-crimes/. 
142. Id.  
143. NATASHA ARNPRIESTER & OLGA BYRNE, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 
PUNISHING REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S MISUSE OF 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 4 (Jan. 2018).  
144. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PROSECUTING MIGRANTS FOR COMING TO 
THE UNITED STATES 5 (May 2018), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/ 
sites/default/files/research/prosecuting_migrants_for_coming_to_the_united_states.
pdf.  
145. Id.  
146. ARNPRIESTER & BYRNE, supra note 143, at 19-20.  
147. Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Attorney General 
Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy for Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018).  
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the southern border that was caused by Congress’ failure to “pass 
effective legislation that serves the national interest[,] . . . closes 
dangerous loopholes[,] and fully funds a wall along our southern 
border.”148  However, Sessions failed to mention how the 
Administration’s implicitly sanctioned CBP policies of rejection and 
metering were greatly contributing to the increase in irregular border 
crossings. 
During the Trump Administration and the month before the new 
“zero-tolerance” policy was implemented, prosecutions of first time 
illegal entrants skyrocketed—increasing by 448.1%.149  The majority 
of the controversy surrounding this new policy focused on the 
humanitarian crisis created by the illegal separation of parents from 
their children.150  Under the policy, parents were detained and forced to 
await prosecution while their children were classified as 
unaccompanied minors and transferred to Health and Human Services’ 
Office of Refugee Resettlement.151  However, the negative impact that 
this dramatic increase in prosecutions of illegal entry had on asylum 
seekers’ ability to seek protection in the United States must also be 
recognized.  It is unknown exactly how many asylum seekers may have 
been coerced into pleading guilty and may have forgone their right to 
seek asylum in the United States in exchange for little to no prison time.  
Furthermore, even for asylum seekers who are given the opportunity to 
continue to pursue their asylum claims after conviction of an entry-
related defense, additional barriers still exist; the DHS often prioritizes 
the future criminal prosecution or deportation of individuals with prior 
federal convictions.152 
Increasing prosecutions of illegal border crossers, including asylum 
seekers, buttressed Trump’s hateful immigrant rhetoric.  In addition to 
branding asylum seekers who felt increasingly obligated to enter the 
                                                          
148. Id.  
149. Immigration Prosecutions for February 2018, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Mar. 
26, 2018), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/ monthlyfeb18/fil/.  
150. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Ms. L v. ICE (June 6, 
2019), https://www.aclu.org/cases/ms-l-v-ice.  
151. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: Zero-Tolerance 
Prosecution and Family Reunification (June 23, 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/23/fact-sheet-zero-tolerance-prosecution-and-
family-reunification.   
152. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, supra note 144, at 4.  
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United States outside of a port of entry as “illegitimate,” the 
Administration was able to use the “zero-tolerance” policy to classify 
them as federally convicted criminals as well. 
D. Policy Changes to the Credible Fear Process 
The Trump Administration has heightened the legal standard for 
credible fear and increased the scrutiny of asylum claims during the 
credible fear screening process, in another attempt to undermine the 
refugee exception to the expedited removal process.153  Once an 
individual in the expedited removal process expresses a fear of return 
to his or her home country or intent to apply for asylum, CBP officials 
must refer the individual to USCIS for a credible fear screening.154  If 
an individual establishes a credible fear of persecution or torture if 
repatriated, the asylum officer must refer that person to an immigration 
judge to adjudicate his or her asylum claim in removal proceedings 
under INA section 240.155  According to the Administration, thousands 
of illegal, criminal immigrants are abusing and defrauding this system 
simply by stating “the magic words needed to trigger the credible fear 
process”—they fear returning home.156 
In his 2017 remarks to the Executive Office of Immigration 
Review, Sessions made it clear that the Administration believes “[t]he 
[credible fear] system is being gamed . . . [and] has become an easy 
ticket to illegal entry into the United States.”157  According to Sessions, 
“[s]aying a few simple words is now transforming a straightforward 
arrest and immediate return into a probable release and a hearing.”158  
                                                          
153. See, e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES – RAIO, ASYLUM 
DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION AND 
TORTURE DETERMINATIONS (effective Feb. 27, 2017) [hereinafter USCIS CREDIBLE 
FEAR LESSON PLAN] (on file with American Immigration Lawyers Association), 
https://www.aila.org/infonet/raio-and-asylum-division-officer-training-course; 
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018).  
154. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2008).  
155. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f) (2019).  
156. Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks to the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-
executive-office-immigration-review.  
157. Id. 
158. Id.  
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Furthermore, Sessions claimed the adjudication process is also broken 
because “DHS found a credible fear in 88 percent of claims 
adjudicated[, which] means an alien entering the United States illegally 
has an 88 percent chance to avoid expedited removal simply by 
claiming a fear of return.”159  To reduce the amount of asylum seekers 
entering the United States, Sessions announced the Administration’s 
plans to make it more difficult for asylum seekers in expedited removal 
proceedings to receive a positive finding of credible fear. 160  In other 
words, because U.S. government officials too frequently found 
southern border crossers to be legitimate asylum seekers, undermining 
Trump’s self-serving imagery of criminal immigrant masses 
endangering the security of the United States, the Administration made 
it more difficult for asylum seekers to access legal protections. 
One way in which the Administration sought to achieve this was to 
amend the guidance given to the Asylum Office regarding credible fear 
determinations.  In February 2017, the USCIS amended its “Credible 
Fear Lesson Plan,” elevating the threshold of the “credibility” 
requirements for asylum seekers. 161  Previously, to find the applicant 
credible, an asylum officer only needed to find that an individual had 
“‘a significant possibility’ that, in a full hearing, an immigration judge 
could deem the applicant credible.”162  Under the new guidance, USCIS 
clarified that a “significant possibility” was more than a “mere 
possibility.”163  The new guidance also introduced more stringent 
requirements that the asylum officer find the claim not only credible, 
but also persuasive and specific.164  These new requirements raised 
                                                          
159. Id.  
160. Id.  
161. USCIS CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 153; see USCIS Amends 
Credible Fear Lesson Plans, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC., 
https://cliniclegal.org/resources/uscis-amends-credible-fear-lesson-plans (last visited 
July 21, 2019) (identifying the revised Credible Fear Lesson Plan’s three major 
changes and explaining the seemingly increased threshold poses greater difficulty for 
bona fide asylum seekers).  
162. AILA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 83.  
163. USCIS CREDIBLE FEAR LESSON PLAN, supra note 153, at 15.  
164. Id. at 14.  See USCIS Amends Credible Fear Lesson Plans, supra note 161. 
Since the writing of this article, USCIS has issued newer guidance in an April 30, 
2019, Credible Fear Lesson Plan. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES – 
RAIO, ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR OF 
PERSECUTION AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS (Apr. 30, 2019), 
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asylum seekers’ burden, heightening the level of specific, sensitive, and 
traumatic details that they must provide to establish a credible fear.  
Positive credible fear determinations dropped four percent in the first 
eleven months following the application of this new guidance.165 
Next, Sessions issued a broad-scale attack on credible fear 
determinations and asylum protections more generally in his Matter of 
A-B- decision.166  In Matter of A-B-, the respondent was a Salvadoran 
woman fleeing physical, emotional, and sexual abuse from her ex-
husband.167  The Board of Immigration Appeals found that she was 
eligible for asylum based on persecution because of her membership in 
the “particular social group of ‘El Salvadoran women who are unable 
to leave their domestic relationships where they have children in 
common’ with their partners”; that classification was sufficiently 
similar to the social group of “‘married women in Guatemala who are 
unable to leave their relationship,’ which the Board [of Immigration 
Appeals previously] had recognized in Matter of A-R-C-G-.”168  In 
referring the case, Sessions sought to review under what circumstances 
“being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a cognizable 
‘particular social group’ for purposes of an application for asylum or 
withholding of removal.” 169  Many immigration advocates saw 
Session’s resulting decision as a full-scale attack on asylum seekers 
fleeing domestic abuse and gang-related crimes in Central America. 
In Matter of A-B-, Sessions prescribed that individuals fleeing 
persecution by private actors, such as domestic abusers or gang 
members, would have difficulty establishing a nexus to a protected 
ground.  He stated that “[w]hen private actors inflict violence based on 
a personal relationship with a victim, then the victim’s membership in 
a larger group may well not be ‘one central reason’ for the abuse[, . . . 
especially] [w]hen ‘the alleged persecutor is not even aware of the 
                                                          
https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/mkt/11/10239/10146/2019%20training%20do
cument%20for%20asylum%20screenings.pdf.  
165. AILA POLICY BRIEF, supra note 83, at 5 n.44.  
166. See generally Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018). 
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i), the Attorney General may review any decision of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals that he or she directs the BIA to refer.  
167. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 321 (Att’y Gen. 2018).  
168. Id. at 321 (quoting Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014)).  
169. Id. at 317 (quoting 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). 
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group’s existence.’”170  Sessions also raised the burden regarding the 
government protection element of an asylum claim, declaring that 
asylum seekers fleeing private actors “must show more than [mere] 
‘difficulty . . . controlling’ private behavior”;171 additionally, asylum 
seekers “must show that the government condoned the private actions 
‘or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect 
victims.’”172  Sessions also highlighted that asylum seekers should face 
increased scrutiny regarding their ability to safely relocate within their 
home country to avoid persecution by a private actor because “[w]hen 
the applicant has suffered personal harm at the hands of only a few 
specific individuals, internal relocation would seem more 
reasonable.”173  Ultimately, Sessions went as far as to declare that 
“[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or gang 
violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for 
asylum.”174 
Sessions also lambasted the credible fear process: 
Finally, there are alternative proper and legal channels for seeking 
admission to the United States other than entering the country 
illegally and applying for asylum in a removal proceeding . . . . 
Aliens seeking a better life in America are welcome to take 
advantage of existing channels to obtain legal status before entering 
the country. In this case, A-B- entered the country illegally, and when 
initially apprehended by Border Patrol agents, she stated that her 
reason for entering the country was “to find work and reside” in the 
United States. Aliens seeking an improved quality of life should seek 
legal work authorization and residency status, instead of illegally 
entering the United States and claiming asylum.175 
In a final footnote, Sessions reminded all asylum adjudicators that 
asylum is a discretionary form of relief that is not automatically granted 
when an applicant meets the statutory eligibility requirements.176  He 
                                                          
170. Id. at 338-39 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)).  
171. Id. at 337 (quoting Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 
2005)). 
172. Id. at 337 (quoting Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 2000)).  
173. Id. at 345. 
174. Id. at 320.  
175. Id. at 345.  
176. Id. at 345 n.12.  
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provided a list of relevant discretionary factors, the first of which was 
“the circumvention of orderly refugee procedures.”177  USCIS guidance 
to asylum officers adjudicating credible fear claims built on this closing 
salvo: 
USCIS personnel may find an applicant’s illegal entry, including any 
intentional evasion of U.S. authorities, and including any convictions 
for illegal entry where the alien does not demonstrate good cause for 
the illegal entry, to weigh against a favorable exercise of discretion. 
In particular, “the circumvention of orderly refugee procedures” 
factor may take into account whether the alien entered the United 
States without inspection and, if not, whether the applicant had other 
ways to lawfully enter this country . . . . An officer should consider 
whether the applicant demonstrated ulterior motives for the illegal 
entry that are inconsistent with a valid asylum claim that the 
applicant wished to present to U.S. authorities.178 
The Attorney General’s decision in Matter of A-B- was immediately 
binding precedent on all DHS officers and employees, including USCIS 
officers and immigration judges.179 
Session’s holding in Matter of A-B- sought to wipe out a large 
swath of potential asylum claims.  The holding conveniently pulled 
together the negative repercussions of various Trump era policies to 
serve in rejecting the legitimate claims of asylum seekers and to bolster 
the Administration’s imagery of illegal border crossers as criminals and 
threats to national security.  For example, increased port of entry denials 
and CBP abuse at the border led to a significant increase in the number 
of individuals entering the United States illegally, which should now 
“weigh against a favorable exercise of discretion.”180  Similarly, 
“ulterior motives for illegal entry,” such as the statements included in 
falsified CBP admissibility screenings and convictions for illegal entry, 
which increased markedly with Trump’s “zero-tolerance” policy, 
should now also be considered adverse factors for discretionary asylum 
                                                          
177. Id.  
178. Memorandum from the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services on 
Guidance for Processing Reasonable Fear, Credible Fear, Asylum, and Refugee 
Claims in Accordance with Matter of A-B- (July 11, 2017) [hereinafter USCIS 
Guidance for Processing] (on file with American Immigration Lawyers Association).   
179. 8 C.F.R. § 103.10(b) (2011); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2018).  
180. USCIS Guidance for Processing, supra note 178.  
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relief.181  In August 2018, the ACLU challenged these new policies on 
behalf of numerous asylum seekers who were processed according to 
the Matter of A-B- guidelines and denied at the credible fear review 
level.182  The ACLU asserted that the policy changes were inconsistent 
with the Refugee Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the 
Administrative Procedure Act, and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.183  In December 2018, the District Court for the District 
of Columbia found that the majority of the higher legal standards 
contained in Matter of A-B- were arbitrary, capricious, and violative of 
U.S. immigration law.184  Accordingly, the court enjoined the DHS 
from applying those parts in future credible fear proceedings.185 
CONCLUSION 
In 2016, Donald Trump ran a successful presidential campaign 
predicated on fear and racism.  Since his election, he has continued to 
build on his anti-immigrant rhetoric to maintain public support as he 
zealously attempts to fulfill a key campaign promise to build a border 
wall.  In a last-ditch effort to secure funding for this wall, Trump has 
declared a national emergency grounded in the idea that the influx of 
illegal border crossers is an attack on U.S. security and safety.  The 
possibility that a substantial percentage of these individuals might be 
legitimate asylum seekers serves to undermine this political position.  
As a result, steps have been taken to delegitimize asylum seekers. 
Since 2017, the Trump Administration has tacitly or explicitly 
approved the implementation of policies that sought to achieve the 
following objectives: (1) drive potential asylum seekers away from 
legal ports of entry, (2) penalize them with criminal prosecution or 
divest them of the right to seek asylum if they crossed the border 
illegally, (3) raise the legal burden of proof in establishing a credible 
fear of persecution for individuals in expedited removal proceedings; 
and (4) deny discretionary asylum in cases of illegal border crossings 
                                                          
181. Id.  
182. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Grace v. 
Sessions, No. 1:18-cv-01853 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2018).  
183. Id.  
184. Order, Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-
01853).  
185. Id.  
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and convictions for illegal entry.  U.S. immigration law diverges from 
international law in various ways regarding the rights of asylum seekers 
and the obligations of receiving States, namely by failing to observe the 
non-rejection principle of non-refoulement, penalizing illegal border 
crossers, and implementing the credible fear process.  The 
Administration has been able to build upon these inconsistencies in an 
attempt to impugn asylum seekers and substantiate false claims for 
political gain. 
However, asylum seekers and immigration advocates have resisted 
each of the Administration’s politically-motivated attempts to 
implement policies geared toward negatively shaping the public 
imagery of immigration into the United States.  Following fast actions 
by the immigration legal community, the courts have struck down or 
temporarily enjoined a number of policies aimed specifically at 
stripping asylum seekers of their rights.186  But the fight has only just 
begun.  As the United States gears up for the 2020 elections, Trump 
continues to lean on his anti-immigration, fear-based rhetoric in an 
attempt to solidify his base and garner additional political support.187  
Further, new policies seeking to restrict the flow of legitimate asylum 
seekers to the United States, in contravention of non-refoulement 
obligations, are continuously being devised.188 
The current administration has utilized, and weaponized, the 
existing immigration legal framework to support its political ends.  
                                                          
186. See, e.g., id.; Cagnant Complaint, supra note 111; Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & 
N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018). 
187. During a March 2019 campaign rally, President Trump openly mocked an 
asylum seeker who appeared to be too strong-looking to be fleeing persecution, before 
blanketly calling asylum claims a “big fat con job.” Kate Riga, WATCH: Trump 
Mocks Asylum Seekers at Rally, Calls Process a ‘Big Fat Con Job’, TALKING POINTS 
MEMO (Mar. 29, 2019, 10:52 AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/trump-
mocks-asylum-seekers-rally-big-fat-con-job.  
188. See, e.g., Makini Brice, Trump Threatens More Tariffs on Mexico over 
Part of Immigration Deal, REUTERS (June 10, 2019, 3:51 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-mexico/trump-threatens-more-tariffs-
on-mexico-over-part-of-immigration-deal-idUSKCN1TB182; Press Release, Human 
Rights First, Safe Third Country Agreement with Guatemala Would Endanger, Not 
Protect Refugees (June 14, 2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/press-
release/safe-third-country-agreement-guatemala-would-endanger-not-protect-
refugees; Louise Radnofsky, Trump Says Guatemala Is Set to Help Stem Migrant 
Flow, WALL ST. J. (June 18, 2019, 12:44 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-
says-guatemala-is-set-to-help-stem-migrant-flow-11560833062.  
36
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol50/iss1/4
Woods camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/18/2020  12:00 PM 
2019]   HOW U.S. POLICIES AND PRACTICES ARE CONTROLLING THE BORDER 117 
While civil society and the legal community must continue to valiantly 
challenge these new, restrictive policies head-on, more systemic 
reforms are also required to strengthen the statutory and regulatory 
framework of U.S. immigration law to bring it more in line with 
international obligations toward asylum seekers.  Recognition of the 
non-rejection principle of non-refoulement should be codified in U.S. 
law, as should exceptions from criminal prosecution for illegal entrants 
seeking asylum.  The process of expedited removal should also be 
thoroughly examined and overhauled to ensure compliance with non-
refoulement obligations.  The first step in building the political support 
and movement necessary for such reforms must be to counter the false 
rhetoric that surrounds U.S. immigration policy and discourse. 
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